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AbstRAct
South Africa’s membership of the brics has sti-
rred controversy. A number of observers have 
argued that South Africa is too small in terms 
of economy and population to be considered 
an authentic member of this group. In this 
article, the author accepts that South Africa 
may have no place in the analytical construct 
that Jim O’Neill of Goldman Sachs invented 
in 2001, but also argues that South Africa is a 
valuable and legitimate member of the political 
construct that we know today as the bric(s). 
South Africa has the “soft power” needed to 
play a constructive role in the rebalancing of 
geopolitical power globally, and is a potential 
voice for the continent of Africa. However, 
South Africa’s position in the brics must be 
understood in terms of its own contested role 
as a leader in Africa; the ambiguous outcomes 
of the brics engagement with this continent; 
and the danger that the brics may become an 
exclusive self-selected grouping rather than a 
potent force for greater global equity.
Key words: brics, Africa, soft power, 
global order, geopolitics.
sudáfrica en los Brics
Resumen
La membresía de Sudáfrica en los brics ha 
generado controversia. Un gran número de 
observadores han argumentado que este país es 
demasiado pequeño en términos de economía 
y población para ser un miembro real de este 
grupo. En este texto se acepta que Sudáfrica 
podría no tener un lugar en la construcción 
analítica que Jim O’Neill, de Goldman Sachs, 
inventó en 2001; sin embargo, también se ar-
guye que es un miembro válido y legítimo de 
la construcción política que hoy en día conoce-
mos como bric(s). Sudáfrica tiene el soft power 
(poder blando) que se necesita para jugar un 
papel constructivo en el reequilibrio global del 
poder geopolítico, y es una voz potencial para 
el continente africano. A pesar de lo anterior, la 
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1 The report went on to point out that “If South Africa were a province in China, its gdp would rank number six, 
just above Hebei, a producer of coal and sorghum”. Business Report, 22 March, 2013.
2 Reuters, 17 November, 2010.
posición de Sudáfrica en los brics debe ser en-
tendida en términos de su controvertido papel 
como líder en África; los resultados ambiguos 
del compromiso de los brics con el continente, 
y el peligro de que estos se puedan convertir en 
un grupo exclusivo y autoseleccionado en lugar 
de una fuerza poderosa que logre una mayor 
equidad global.
Palabras clave: brics, África, poder blan-
do, orden global, geopolítica.
IntRoductIon
When the bric (Brazil, Russia, India and 
China) foreign ministers met in New York 
in September 2010 they agreed that South 
Africa would be accepted into the alliance. 
South Africa was accordingly invited to the 
Third brics Summit held in China in April 
2011, and bric became brics. This was an 
occasion widely celebrated in South Africa but 
also received with a degree of skepticism by a 
number of commentators in the country and 
internationally (Naidu, 2013). South Africa’s 
Business Report put it like this - “The hearty 
self-congratulation with which South Africa 
welcomed its accession to the bric grouping of 
major emerging countries has been met with a 
deafening silence from global investors”1. The 
misgivings had to do with Jim O’ Neill’s initial 
conception of the bric as a grouping of nations 
outside the historically recognized global core 
high potential for future economic growth on 
the basis of the size of their economies and po-
pulation, and growth performance in the im-
mediate past (O’Neill, 2001). When O’Neill 
was asked in 2010 whether South Africa should 
be a bric, he replied with a categorical “no”2.
This Chapter compares South Africa to 
its fellow brics, asking whether there is a ra-
tionale for including this small country with 
its slow-to-medium economic growth within 
this geopolitical cluster. It confirms that South 
Africa is a “minnow” within brics and that in 
terms of the criterion of size, South Africa’s 
membership of brics is incongruous. Howe-
ver, when using size neutral criteria, South 
Africa falls within the range of variability of 
the original bric countries.
More importantly, the Chapter argues 
that the idea of the bric(s) has evolved beyond 
the analytical construct developed by O’Neill 
and his Goldman Sachs’ colleagues into a po-
litical construct with the pragmatic purpose 
of developing a geopolitical node of influence 
as an alternative to the historically dominant 
alliance of North America and Western Euro-
pe. In terms of this understanding, there is a 
credible, even compelling, rationale for South 
Africa’s membership of brics.
“the mInnow”
Table 1 indicates clearly that in terms of size 
South Africa is a real minnow within brics. It 
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accounts for a mere 1.7 per cent of the combi-
ned population of brics, and an only slightly 
higher 2.6 per cent of the combined value of 
economic output. The economic growth in 
recent years has also been low, closer to post-
recession global figures than to that of the 
brics giants, China and India.
tAbLe 1. south AfRIcA In compARIson to 
otheR bRIcs countRIes In teRms of sIze of 
popuLAtIon And economy, And In teRms of 
Recent RAtes of gdp gRowth
Country













Brazil 193 6.6 2 252 15.4 2.5
Russia 143 4.9 2 007 13.8 1.3
India 1 210 41.0 1 743 11.9 5.0
China 1 351 45.8 8 227 56.3 7.7
South 
Africa
51 1.7 384 2.6 1.9
Total 
BRICS
2 948 100.0 14 613 100.0 -
Source: brics Joint Statistical Publication, 2013.
From the perspective of size and economic 
growth, there is little if any rationale for South 
Africa’s membership of brics. It should, howe-
ver, be noted that even before South Africa’s 
accession, there was considerable variation 
among the bric countries with Russia, for 
example, having a population of 143 million 
compared with China’s 1.35 billion. Also, 
in terms of economic growth, South Africa’s 
post global recession growth rates are at least 
comparable with those of Brazil and Russia3.
These qualifications notwithstanding, it 
is clear that South Africa does not meet the 
Jim O’Neill standards for bric membership. 
Is South Africa, however, comparable in terms 
of size-neutral criteria? We explore the ques-
tion below in relation to the economy, level 




There are two broad sets of economic indica-
tors. First, the conventional indicators of eco-
nomic strength which, apart from growth in 
gdp, include measures of capital investment, 
inflation, unemployment, foreign direct in-
vestment, levels of debt, share prices, credit 
growth, and so on, which are complemented 
also with subjective measures such as the levels 
of business confidence (see table 2). Then, 
there are various rankings and measures of 
“competitiveness” and “innovation” that take 
account of a broader range of factors including 
the strength of institutions, the sophistication 
of markets, the quality of infrastructure, and 
levels of creative output (see tables 3 and 4).
In terms of the first set of indicators, 
drawn from the imf database, South Africa’s 
3 Sandrey and Vink (2013) point out that the brics have not enjoyed spectacular levels of gdp growth in recent 
years, and so gdp growth may hardly be regarded as a necessary condition for brics membership.
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performance is mixed. On the negative side, 
South Africa has a level of unemployment 
which dramatically exceeds that of its fellow 
brics. On other indicators, however, South 
Africa does not fall outside the range of the 
others. Economic concerns for South Africa 
include the low levels of capital formation (but 
this is shared with Brazil); and the high current 
account deficit and low levels of foreign direct 
investment (common with India). On the po-
sitive side, South Africa’s inflation is lower than 
the other brics; the economy is more open to 
the world than the other brics; levels of debt 
are low; and the stock market has outperfor-
med that of the others.
Importantly, South Africa’s economy 
is relatively well diversified and structurally 
mature in relation to the others, with the ex-
ception of Brazil. South Africa and Brazil have 
well developed tertiary economies while India 
is still strongly geared towards agriculture and 
low wage manufacturing; Russia is still largely 
dependent on oil and gas; and China is now a 
predominantly manufacturing economy.
South Africa also performs comparati-
vely well in terms of “competitiveness” and 
“innovation”. In recent rankings for compe-
titiveness and innovation, South Africa ranks 
second in brics after China, although only 
marginally ahead of Russia, Brazil and India 
(table 3). South Africa’s rankings are buoyed 
by the strength of its institutions, the quality 
of its regulatory environment, and its market 
and business sophistication. On the downside, 
South Africa has severe weaknesses in terms of 
the quality of its education, and the scale of 
investment in R&D (table 4).
social indicators
The social indicators presented in table 5 –and 
sourced mainly from the undp’s Human Deve-
lopment Report– reveal considerable diversity 
within brics.
tAbLe 2. Imf’s pRIncIpLe gLobAL IndIcAtoRs foR bRIcs, 2013 (oR As IndIcAted)
Indicators brazil Russia India China South Africa 
Gross Capital Fixed Formation (% of GD), 2012 19.3 23.1 29.5 45.5 18.9
Consumer Price Index 6.2 6.8 10.9 2.6 5.7
Unemployment Rate 5.4 5.5 - 4.1 24.7
Current account deficit as a per cent of GDP, 2012 -2.4 +3.5 -4.8 +2.6 -5.2
Exports of goods & services as a percent of GDP, 2010 12.2 32.8 22.6 32.0 26.4
fDI as a percent of GDP, 2007-2011 2.7 2.8 1.4 3.1 1.4
Debt service as a percent of GDP, 2009 2.1 4.2 1.2 1.0 1.4
Share Prices 2013, with 2010 = 100 79.8 101.9 105.8 77.6 141.6
Business Confidence Index, Jan 2014 100.0 100.4 - 98.8 99.4
Source: imf Statistics.
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tAbLe 3. gLobAL competItIveness And InnovAtIon RAnkIngs, 2013
Country
Total Competitiveness Ranking 
(World Economic Forum)
Innovation Ranking (World Econo-
mic Forum)
Innovation Ranking (Global Intellectual 
Property Organization)
Brazil 56 55 64
Russia 64 78 62
India 60 41 66
China 29 32 35
South Africa 53 39 58
Source: wef, 2013; World Intellectual Property Organization and Johnson Cornell University.
tAbLe 4. bRIcs RAnkIngs In the component segments of the gLobAL InteLLectuAL  















Brazil 95 75 51 76 42 67 72 64
Russia 87 33 49 74 52 48 101 62
India 102 105 89 49 94 37 65 66
China 113 36 44 35 33 2 96 35
SA 44 102 83 16 71 79 68 58
Source: wef, 2013.
tAbLe 5. socIAL IndIcAtoRs foR the compARIson of bRIcs countRIes  
(fIguRes foR 2012 unLess otheRwIse IndIcAted)
Indicator brazil Russia India China South Africa
GDP Per Capita gdp (USD), 2013, IMf 12 221 17 884 4 077 9 844 11 259
GDP Per Capita IMF Global Rankings, 2013 79th 58th 133rd 93rd 84th 
Income Gini Coefficient 54.7 40.1 33.4 42.5 63.1
Percent of population below income poverty 
line of PPP $1.25 day
6.1 0.0 32.7 13.1 13.8
Infant mortality (per 1000 live births) 20.3 8.7 47.0 12.1 37.9
Life expectancy at birth (years) 73.8 69.8 69.1 73.7 53.4
Fertility rate per woman 1.6  1.6 2.5 - 2.4
Natural increase of population (per 1000) 7.9 -0.02 14.9 5.0 9.3
Urbanization level (percentage) 84.6 73.8 31.3 53.7 62.0
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4 For countries where data is available for income inequality, South Africa has the highest income inequality except 
for the Comoros, a small island state.
In terms of gdp per capita, South Afri-
ca has a median position within brics - it is 
better-off than India and China; poorer than 
Russia; and comparable with Brazil. It also has 
a median position in terms of poverty levels - it 
is better-off than India; worse-off than Russia 
and Brazil; and comparable with China.
However, South Africa has the highest 
levels of inequality in brics (and almost in the 
world)4. Infant mortality rates are also high 
(second only to India) while life expectancy is 
by far the lowest in brics, largely due to the 
hiv/aids epidemic. Fertility rates in South Afri-
ca are still relatively high by brics standards 
although population growth is modest because 
of high mortality rates. Levels of urbanization 
in South Africa are relatively high but there is 
still space for increase, unlike Russia and Bra-
zil where urbanization is at a near saturation 
point. South Africa is still a dangerous place 
with high levels of homicide, higher even than 
Brazil. In terms of gender equality, South Afri-
ca ranks relatively poorly in brics, although 
significantly better than India.
The undp’s composite Human Develop-
ment Index (hDi) ranks South Africa relatively 
poorly at 121st in the world which is the worst 
in brics except for India. Nevertheless, across 
the indicators it is only in relation to income 
inequality and personal safety that South 
Africa falls unambiguously outside the range 
of the other brics.
environmental sustainability
The brics generally do not perform well in 
terms of environmental sustainability but, as 
indicated in table 6, there is variation. Brazil 
is the best performing country as it has rela-
tively low dependence on fossil fuels; carbon 
emissions per capita are low; and natural re-
source depletion and fresh water withdrawal 
is modest compared with brics counterparts. 
On the other extreme is Russia, which is hea-
vily dependent on fossil fuels; has high rates 
of per capita carbon dioxide and greenhouse 
gas emissions; and also high rates of natural 
resource depletion. India does relatively well 
Indicator brazil Russia India China South Africa
Homicide rate per 100 000 21.0 10.2 3.4 1.1 31.8
Gender equality, global ranking, 2010 71st 48th 122nd 32nd 80th 
Human Development Index (HDI) 0.73 0.788 0.554 0.699 0.629
Human Development Index (HDI) global ran-
king (UNDP)
85th 55th 136th 101st 121st 
Sources: brics Joint Statistical Publication, 2013; World Urbanization Prospect, 2013; Human Development Report, undp, 2013.
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in per capita terms on emissions and natural 
resource depletion but this is because it still 
has a relatively poor population. The pressure 
of population, however, means that there are 
serious problems in terms of water resources 
and land degradation. China is moderately 
high in terms of all indicators but the sca-
le of its population and economy means 
that it has an extremely large environmental 
footprint.
South Africa does not perform well on 
these indicators. It ranks behind Russia as the 
second worst performer in brics. It is heavily 
dependent on fossil fuels for energy, and while 
the total weight of emissions is modest given 
the small size of South Africa’s economy, it has 
high levels in per capita terms. South Africa is 
also stressed in terms of fresh water resources 
and a high percentage of occupied land is 
degraded. Given Russia’s even worse perfor-
mance, South Africa is not outside the range 
of the other brics.
summary comparisons
In terms of size neutral indicators, South 
Africa’s positive relation to the other brics is 
complex and variable. South Africa performs 
poorly against China on almost all econo-
mic indicators although South Africa is still 
wealthier in per capita terms. However, even 
this gap is rapidly narrowing with China’s ra-
pid development, and South Africa has a lower 
hdi than China because of its high income 
inequality, high infant mortality and low life 
expectancy. South Africa compares more fa-
vourably with India. It shares similar economic 
vulnerabilities and has a gdp per capita which 
is twice that of India. The gap between South 
Africa and India is less in terms of hdi.
South Africa and Brazil have similar eco-
nomic profiles, although the broad trajectory 
of development over the past decade has been 
more positive in Brazil than in South Africa. 
The two countries have similar gdp per capita 
but South Africa’s hdi is significantly worse. 
South Africa also has far worse performance in 
tAbLe 6. IndIcAtoRs of sustAInAbILIty
Indicator brazil Russia India China South Africa 
Fossil Fuels as a Percent of Total Energy Use, 2009 51.3 90.2 73.0 87.4 87.8
Total carbon dioxide emissions (megatonnes), 2008 393 1709 1 743 7 032 436
Per capita carbon dioxide emissions (tonnes), 2008 2.1 12.0 1.5 5.3 8.9
Per capita greenhouse gas emissions, 2008 4.0 4.9 0.7 1.5 1.9
Natural resource depletion (% of gni) 3.4 14.3 4.4 5.1 6.1
Fresh water withdrawal (% of total renewable 
water), 2003-2012
0.7 1.5 39.8 19.5 25.0
Population on degraded land 8.0 3.0 10.0 9.0 17.0
Source: Human Development Report, undp, 2013.
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terms of environmental sustainability. Russia 
is in a generally stronger position than South 
Africa in terms of most economic indicators 
but is arguably more economically vulnerable 
than South Africa because of its high depen-
dence on primary sectors. It is also ranked as 
less competitive than South Africa because of 
its weaker institutional environment and its 
less sophisticated business sector. However, in 
terms of social indicators, Russia convincingly 
outperforms South Africa. On environmental 
indicators Russia is the worst.
The question of whether it makes analyti-
cal sense for South Africa to be a part of brics 
remains open. If the criterion is size, South 
Africa is not a brics and could be better com-
pared with, or included within, other catego-
ries of countries such as the civets (Colombia, 
Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South 
Africa) or the mint (Mexico, Indonesia, Nige-
ria, Turkey) (Sandrey and Fink, 2013; Ghosh, 
2013). As indicated, however, there are many 
size neutral indicators in which South Africa 
is comparable to the other brics.
The question of analytical integrity does 
not only relate to South Africa. Armijo (2007, 
p. 16) asks, for example, “Is Russia a declining 
major power or an emergent bric?” Armijo 
(2007) rightfully questioned whether the 
bric –even in the absence of South Africa– 
made sense as an analytical category given the 
immense differences between the countries.
fRom AnALytIcAL to poLItIcAL  
constRuct
Armijo (2007) concluded that clustering into 
bric on the basis of apparent similarities or 
shared developmental challenges is an analyti-
cal deception, and that we should understand 
brics in terms of its geopolitical rationale. 
She writes:
…an alternative and equally valid way to ap-
proach the question might be to ask where the brics 
countries form a set because they have a similar type 
of influence in, or equivalent implications for, the 
international economic or political system. Do they 
alter the conditions of interactions for other players 
– whether states, firms or international organizations 
– in parallel ways? It is in this latter sense that the set 
of “brics economies” or “brics countries” may have 
merit as an analytical category (p. 9).
Zondi (2012, p. 1) pointed to the political 
rationale of brics - “The unstated aim of the 
discourse of north-south relations in South 
African foreign circles is not only about benefi-
cial economic relations, but also the neorealist 
idea of external balancing by joining alliances 
that are seen as alternative to dominant centres 
of global power”. Pieterse (2011, p. 22) wro-
te to the rise of the brics as an “East-South 
turn”, and referred to positive interpretations 
of this geopolitical rebalancing as a process of 
“emancipatory multipolarity”. Naidu (2013) 
also stressed the political rationale, indicating 
the link between South Africa’s agenda of in-
fluence and reform in global institutions and 
its membership of brics.
There are, of course, more cynical inter-
pretations. A Greek commentator referred, for 
example, to “the infamous nouveau riche brics 
group” (Karakousis, 2014, p. 1). There is also 
the complex relationship between the brics 
and the sometimes dissonant political agen-
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das of individual brics countries, an example 
being the contestation for influence between 
China and India (Naidu, 2013). There is a 
further concern that brics is an uncomforta-
ble political agglomeration with India, Brazil 
and South Africa as working democracies but 
with Russia as a de facto authoritarian state and 
China as a one-party dictatorship. The danger 
for South Africa, India and Brazil is that, rather 
than influencing the brics collective towards 
greater democracy, they will be politically trap-
ped in an “anti-liberal coalition” dominated 
by Russia and China (Armijo, 2007). Thus, 
while the brics contribution to a more equi-
table (multipolar) geopolitical order should be 
welcomed, the brics have still to show that the 
nature of their influence in the world is truly 
emancipatory.
South Africa’s inclusion into brics must 
be understood in terms of both the geopolitical 
agenda of the brics collective and the potential 
role that South Africa may play as a gateway to 
Africa (for both the collective and individual 
countries in brics). These two dimensions are 
explored in turn below.
south Africa’s “soft power”5
South Africa’s entry into brics is politically 
advantageous to the other participants in the 
alliance. At one level this is hard to explain as 
South Africa is ranked lowly in terms of natio-
nal power. On the other hand, however, South 
Africa does exert sizeable “soft power” in glo-
bal affairs, a legacy of its celebrated transition 
from apartheid to a non-racial democracy. The 
South African government has argued that one 
of the key benefits it brings to brics is its role 
as “a committed global and regional player 
with proven leadership in promoting more 
inclusive formations in global decision-making 
structures” (rsa, 2013).
David Singer developed the now widely-
used Composite Index of National Capability 
(cinc) index as part of the Correlates of War 
project which is based on six variables, namely 
total population, urban population, iron and 
steel production, energy consumption, mili-
tary personnel, and military expenditure (see 
Singer, 1987). The data generated for 2007 
ranks China as Number One in the World 
followed in rank order by the United States, 
the European Union (as a collective), India, 
Japan, Russia, Brazil, Germany, South Korea, 
the United Kingdom, and France. The brics 
therefore have four places in the cinc Top 
10, and must be regarded as a powerful force 
globally. South Africa, however, ranks a quite 
lowly 31st, between Myanmar and Colombia. 
It is difficult with this measure to explain why 
South Africa would be politically useful to 
the other brics. Countries such as South Ko-
rea, Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia, Mexico and 
Vietnam rank significantly higher than South 
5 “Soft power” is defined as “the influence that enables a state to achieve the outcomes it wants in its international 
interactions, not through coercion or rewards, but through its attractiveness”. The attractiveness is understood in 
terms of a “complex mixture of perceptions, history, current events, consumer goods, and so forth” (Smith, 2012, p. 
70, citing Nye). 
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Africa and would be ostensibly more useful in 
terms of the collective power of brics (Corre-
lates of War, 2014).
The problem with the cinc, however, is 
that it only measured “hard power” and is not 
a reliable measure of the real influence exerted 
by different countries. It is extremely difficult 
to measure “soft power”, something subjecti-
ve and shifting. There are, however, surrogate 
measures such as the Country Brand Index 
which measures the attractiveness of different 
countries to an international audience6. In the 
2012-13 Country Brand Ranking the brics 
were ranked significantly lower than they are 
in the cinc, but, with the exception of Rus-
sia, brics rankings are rising7. South Africa’s 
ranking is significantly higher than Russia and 
China, comparable to India, but lower than 
Brazil. Arguably, South Africa’s participation in 
the brics collection improved the overall glo-
bal image of the alliance (Future Brand, 2013).
Brand Rankings are related to, but are 
not, the equivalent of soft power. A country 
may have low brand rankings (because of 
factors such as crime, corruption or lack of 
democracy) but still exert significant geopoli-
tical influence. There is currently no generally 
accepted index for soft power globally –and 
there are serious questions as to whether it is 
possible to measure soft power in a meaningful 
sense– but the skolkovo Institute for Emer-
ging Market Studies (siems) has attempted an 
index for emerging economies. In the 2014 
ratings, South Africa ranked highly. The Top 
Ten were China, India, Russia, Brazil, South 
Africa, Mexico, Turkey, Hungary, Czech Re-
public and Poland. Significantly, the first five 
were the brics (Michael et al, 2014). South 
Africa’s ranking reflects, in part, its leading 
role over the past decade-and-a-half in mobi-
lizing South-South solidarity in global trade 
negotiations, responses to climate change, 
reform of multilateral institutions, and more. 
It also reflects the continued legacy of Nelson 
Mandela and South Africa’s success in hosting 
global events such as the 2010 fifa World Cup. 
If this index is a meaningful reflection of ac-
tual influence, South Africa’s membership of 
brics does contribute to the collective power 
of the alliance.
south Africa, Africa and the other bRIcs
South Africa has legitimated its role in brics in 
terms of its gateway role within Africa:
In May [2013], the Department of Trade and 
Industry’s Deputy Director-General of Trade and 
Investment South Africa (Tisa) Pumla Ncapayi told 
investors in Japan, during a state visit by President Ja-
cob Zuma, that South Africa is not a member of Brics 
because of the size of its population but by virtue of 
what the country can offer in the way of meaningful 
discussions and participation. Most importantly the 
6 The Top Ten countries in the Brand Rankings are: Switzerland, Canada, Japan, Sweden, New Zealand, Australia, 
Germany, United States, Finland and Norway. The Bottom Ten are, from the lowest: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, 
Iran, Libya, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Syria and Bangladesh.
7 In 2012/13, Russia was ranked at 83rd, China at 66th, South Africa at 43rd, India at 42nd, and Brazil at 28th (Future 
Brand, 2013).
 pi Rev Oasis 19_final.indb   76 10/27/14   3:46 PM
7 7
S o u t h  A f r i c a  i n  t h e  B R I C S
B R I C S
O A S I S ,  N o  1 9  •  E n e r o - j u n i o  2 0 1 4  •  p p .  6 7 - 8 4
country, with developed services and financial sectors, 
represents a gateway to Africa for many potential 
investors8.
It is because of this assertion that we must 
give careful attention to the triangular relation-
ship between South Africa, the rest of Africa, 
and the remaining brics countries. We need 
at least to answer the questions: Can South 
Africa meaningfully represent brics? Is brics 
good for Africa?
South Africa does, arguably, occupy the 
leading position in Sub-Saharan Africa in 
relation to geopolitical and global economic 
influence but the position is contested. South 
Africa’s Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, for exam-
ple, was eventually appointed Chairperson 
of the African Union Commission but only 
after a bitter contest against the incumbent 
supported by Francophone countries, and 
also by South Africa’s rivals for recognition on 
the international stage, Nigeria and Kenya. 
Recently, too, Nigeria’s economy was rated as 
larger than South Africa’s, boosting Nigeria’s 
quest for position as Africa’s representative in 
international forums.
In the short to medium-term the most ju-
dicious choice of candidate to at least represent 
sub-Saharan Africa is, arguably, still South Afri-
ca. Nigeria is by far the most populous country i 
n Africa, and may now have a slightly larger 
gdp than South Africa but the extreme diffi-
culties Nigeria faces internally and on the in-
ternational stage are apparent disqualifications. 
This is represented, for example, in the Country 
Brand Index where Nigeria is eleventh from the 
bottom. In the longer term, however, Nigeria 
may be well placed to supplant South Africa 
as the most plausible representative for Africa9.
The difficulty South Africa may face in 
sustaining its role on the continent is compli-
cated by the lack of a formal mandate from 
other African states. As South Africa’s Mail & 
Guardian pointed out, “while it is true that SA 
has been the default Africa brand on such mat-
ters as hosting international sporting events, 
Africa has never chosen SA to be its stepping 
stone on other matters” (29 March, 2012)10. 
In this respect, however, South Africa’s position 
may be no different from that of Brazil in Latin 
America or India or China in their quadrants 
of Asia. The Mail & Guardian also questioned 
whether South Africa is in reality a gateway to 
the continent as African countries are increa-
singly accessing the world through their own 
resources without the mediation of South 
Africa11. Even in the case of the Southern 
African Development Community (sadc), 
China and Brazil especially have direct access 
to the major growth markets including Angola, 
8 South African Government News Agency, 1-08-2013.
9 The question, however, is whether it would not be judicious for both South Africa and Nigeria to represent African 
interests in international fora.
10 Available in: http://www.thoughtleader.co.za/archbishoptutufellows/2012/03/29/why-south-africa-is-not-the-
worlds-gateway-to-africa/
11 Ibid.
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Mozambique and Botswana. The one aspect 
where South Africa has played a gateway role 
is in relation to financial markets. In 2009 the 
State-owned Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China (icbc) acquired a stake of about 20% 
in the Standard Bank of South Africa which 
gave the Chinese access to the near continent-
wide footprint of the Standard Bank. This was, 
however, before South Africa joined brics.
Is brics good for Africa? This is an area 
of debate as suspicion remains that the brics 
have an interest in Africa as the continent offers 
a lucrative source of raw materials including 
oil and minerals. If the brics involvement 
reinforces the role of Africa as a commodities 
producer, it will hardly assist with long-term 
sustainability and a growth trajectory that will 
eventually lift the continent from poverty. The-
re are scholars warning that the relationship 
between African countries and the brics (in-
cluding South Africa) may come to resemble 
the neo-colonial ties between Africa and the 
West (Andreasson, 2012; Bond, 2013).
This outcome is not inevitable, however. 
The United Nations’ Economic Commission 
for Africa (eca) has explored the implications 
of Africa-brics cooperation for Africa. The eca 
does acknowledge the dangers:
The risks are that the Africa-brics engagement 
could lock African countries into specializing in pri-
mary commodities, crimping the strong productivity 
gains needed to sustain high growth and sharpening 
socio-economic inequalities, side-lining some people 
from the benefits of participation (eca, 2013, p. 3).
At the same time, however, it advises that 
“Africa’s resource endowments create oppor-
tunities to leverage Africa-brics cooperation 
for embarking on an industrial strategy for 
maximizing backward and forward proces-
sing linkages with the commodity sectors” 
(eca, 2013, p. iii). To achieve this would 
“fundamentally require Africa to upgrade its 
strategies and capacities when dealing with 
the brics, specifically including negotiating 
favourable trade concessions from the brics 
and understanding their needs better – in order 
to anticipate trends” (p. 3).
The pragmatic advice from the eca is 
worth giving some attention to:
How should Africa respond to the opportunities 
and challenges presented by Africa-brics cooperation 
and capitalize on it to promote growth, employment 
and structural transformation?
Underlying any reply to this question, Africa 
should design a brics strategy built on mutual inter-
est and respect. Thus African leaders should approach 
brics without submissiveness or gratuitous hostility, 
rejecting any self-portrayal or portrayal by other as 
victims or underdogs in the international system. 
The continent’s relationship with the brics and other 
external partners will be at its most constructive if 
the players are neither supplicants not combatants. 
The focus should be on what works for African go-
vernments in promoting the welfare of their citizens 
and in pursuing sustainable business opportunities 
for African entrepreneurs within the framework of 
Africa-brics – indeed overall South-South coopera-
tion (p. 30).
There is a positive way forward for Africa 
in relation to the brics and South Africa is 
well placed to provide support in this process. 
The realpolitik on the continent may however 
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prevent Africa from engaging as a collective, a 
necessary requirement for equal participation 
with the brics.
benefIt foR south AfRIcA?
The question left hanging is whether mem-
bership of brics is in South Africa’s national 
interest12. The South African government is 
an enthusiastic participant in brics and has 
pointed to numerous advantages for South 
Africa including new markets, growing trade, 
tourism, technological transfer, joint R&D, 
and increased fdi13. The idea is that South 
Africa’s economy will be buoyed if it is more 
closely linked to the new pivots of growth in 
the world. This was apparent in the wake of the 
2008 global financial crisis when South Africa 
was well served by its connection to China’s 
and India’s continually growing economies.
From around 2012, however, capital 
flows were redirected to the North and by 
2014 South Africa, Russia and Brazil faced the 
possibility of recession. China’s economy also 
slowed. There was media reference to a “brics 
malaise”14, and South Africa’s connection to 
the other brics no longer seemed to offer an 
easy lifeline. As a British news report put it 
(with some inaccuracy),
South Africa has tied its fate to China, now its 
biggest trade partner, leaving it exposed as the Chinese 
authorities try to wean the economy off investment 
in heavy industry and as the central bank deflates the 
housing boom. China absorbs 67pc of South Africa’s 
iron ore exports, and a growing share of its thermal 
coal15.
These reports may turn out to be wishful 
thinking on the part of actors in the North 
who are resentful of South Africa’s “southwards 
turn” but it is a warning to South Africa to 
manage risk by retaining a diversity of political 
and economic relationships.
The other challenge facing South Africa 
from the other brics is market competition in 
Africa. In 2006, South Africa was the country 
with the largest investments in Africa, but by 
2011 it had been supplanted by China, and 
there was also growing competition from In-
dia, Brazil and, to a lesser extent, Russia (Kahn, 
2011)16. In terms of trade, South Africa was the 
12 South Africa’s Minister of International Relations and Cooperation has stated that South Africa’s membership of 
brics is anchored in three pillars, namely: to advance our national interests; to promote regional [African] integration; 
and to partner with key players of the South on issues of global governance reforms (Nkoane-Mashabane, 2012).
13 South African Government News Agency, 01-08-2013.
14 The Telegraph, 27 May, 2014.
15 Idem.
16 Post-apartheid South Africa has invested heavily in Africa, in sectors including telecommunications, banking, 
retail and agribusiness. China’s investment has mainly been in oil, extractive industries and transport infrastructure 
but there has been some investment in telecommunications and the financial sector. Brazil has invested in mining with 
Angola as a major gateway while Russia’s investments are still relatively modest and focused mainly in oil and nuclear 
power.
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third largest brics exporter to Africa, after Chi-
na and India, and was only the fourth largest 
importer from Africa, after China, India and 
Brazil (eca, 2013). South Africa is losing mar-
ket share in agricultural goods to other brics 
countries in all countries in Africa  except for 
Zimbabwe17, while China is rapidly gaining 
market share relative to South Africa in exports 
of manufactured goods to Africa, with India al-
so making inroads. In terms of the mining sec-
tor Chinese and Brazilian firms, in  particular, 
are increasingly active on the continent and re-
present growing competition to South African 
firms which have held an historical dominance 
in parts of Africa (Sandrey, Vink & Jensen, 
2013; Sandrey, Fundira & Jensen, 2013).
There are also challenges in terms of 
South Africa’s direct trade relations with the 
other brics. There is concern in South Afri-
ca that “unfairly incentivized” imports from 
brics counterparts (especially China, India, 
and Brazil) may be having a negative impact on 
South Africa’s already stressed manufacturing 
sector (Manufacturing Circle, 2014). South 
Africa’s economy is more open than that of 
the other brics, and is highly vulnerable to 
import competition.
The other brics do, however, offer South 
Africa new market opportunities. There is an 
expansion of exports to the other brics. The 
contribution of the other brics is still relatively 
modest but is expanding, accounting for 16.7 
per cent of the total value of South Africa’s 
exports in 2013, sharply up from 6.2 per cent 
in 2005 (rsa, 2013).
Within brics as a category, China is 
overwhelmingly dominant as an export desti-
nation, followed at a distance by India18. One 
of the concerns is that trade with the other 
brics is reinforcing South Africa’s role in the 
global economy as a commodity exporter. 
South Africa’s export to the other brics is con-
centrated largely in iron and chromium ores 
and coal. The major exports in 2013 values 
were: iron ore to China (R51 billion in 2013); 
chrome ore to China (R15 billion); coal to 
India (R15 billion); and steel to China (R10 
billion) (dti, 2014).
South Africa’s balance of trade with the 
other brics is negative with a deficit that is 
widening (idc, 2013). Again, it is China that 
is overwhelmingly dominant as a source of 
imports. The major imports from the other 
brics are: machinery and other mechanical 
products from China (R71 billion in 2013); 
oils and petroleum products from India (R17 
billion); textiles and clothing from China (R17 
billion); machinery and mechanical products 
from India (5.9 billion); and pharmaceuticals 
from India (R 4 billion). The general patterns 
of providing commodities to export markets 
and importing manufactured products is simi-
lar to South Africa’s trading relationship with 
the global North, while the balance of trade for 
South Africa is worse in relation to the other 
brics than in relation to Europe, for example.
17 In Nigeria, South Africa is losing to China; in Angola to Brazil; in Ghana to China and India; in Kenya to Russia; 
and so on.
18 Brazil and Russia are still very small markets for South Africa.
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In terms of tourism, China is South 
Africa’s most rapidly expanding market, 
although overall numbers are still relatively 
modest when compared with Europe. In 2012, 
13.3 per cent of tourists arriving in South 
Africa from “overseas countries” were from the 
other brics. This was still significantly short 
of Europe’s 53.6 per cent but comparable to 
North America’s 17.7 per cent and more than 
double Australasia’s 5.7 per cent (Statistics 
South Africa, 2012). The tourism figures for 
January 2014 reveal that China is now the 
fourth largest source of tourists for South Afri-
ca after the United Kingdom, Germany and 
the United States, with Brazil at 8th place and 
India at 9th (Stats SA, 2014). This was a far cry 
from January 2000 when China was classified 
under “other” in the statistical release. There is 
even a marked difference from January 2010 
when India was at 9th place, followed by Chi-
na at 10th and Brazil at 13th. Between January 
2010 and January 2014, monthly arrivals 
from China increased by 313 per cent (Stats 
SA, 2014).
South Africa’s relationship with the other 
members of the alliance is clearly growing in 
terms of trade and tourism, but with possibly 
mixed benefits in relation to trade. The other 
economic benefits are less apparent, but may 
develop into the future. South Africa may 
also want to participate actively in the newly-
formed brics Development Bank and in the 
establishment of the brics Reserve Fund. 
brics is also gradually developing a platform 
for collaboration in areas such as science and 
technology, urbanization, health and statis-
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tics. There is therefore potential for brics to 
be more than what it is currently is, and the 
evaluation of South Africa’s benefit must take 
account of the currently mixed or ambivalent 
outcomes and the future potentials and risks.
concLusIon
Jim O’Neill is correct in arguing that South 
Africa has no place in the analytical construct 
he played a lead role in inventing in 2001. 
However, it does not follow that South Africa 
is not a valuable and legitimate member of the 
political construct that we know today as the 
bric(s). brics is a grouping of middle weight 
countries in the diplomatic sense which share 
the political agenda of countering the global 
dominance of the global North. South Africa 
does have the “soft power” needed to play a 
constructive role within this grouping and, 
importantly, is an agent for Africa, a continent 
which must play a key role in the rebalancing 
of geopolitical power.
There are, however, pitfalls. These include 
the uneven power balance within brics and 
the danger that brics may emerge as a privi-
leged grouping of self-selected countries with 
a patronizing relationship to the non-brics 
countries in the global South. The danger, too, 
is that brics may become the vehicle for the 
political and economic interests of the larger 
countries in brics, tying South Africa into the-
se agendas. To counter this, the brics grouping 
should systematically extend its membership 
to other countries which are likely to play a 
positive role in the development of a more 
equitable global order.
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